Over the past half-cen­tury, the adop­ti­on of fis­cal rules has beco­me com­mon among both deve­lo­ped and deve­lo­ping eco­no­mi­es. Still, the focus in the lite­ra­tu­re has been on defi­cit or balan­ced-bud­get posi­ti­ons, whi­le the poli­ti­cal eco­nomy of pri­mary sur­plu­ses and the role of inco­me dis­tri­bu­ti­on in affec­ting growth and debt sta­bi­lity have lar­gely been absent from the deba­te. This arti­cle argues that fis­cal policy is, fun­da­men­tally, an ins­tru­ment of class con­flict, and that expen­di­tu­res whi­ch gua­ran­tee inco­me redis­tri­bu­ti­on can be com­pa­ti­ble with debt sta­bi­lity. To for­ma­li­ze this claim, we deve­lop a neo-Kalec­ki­an model that incor­po­ra­tes a fis­cal rule desig­ned to ensu­re a govern­ment sur­plus, along with sup­ply-side cons­traints. The model shows that, in the long run, the­re are two pos­si­ble tra­jec­to­ri­es for the debt-to-capi­tal ratio, depen­ding on the strength of crow­ding-out effects asso­ci­a­ted with public debt, the level of inco­me dis­tri­bu­ti­on, the size of the govern­ment sur­plus and the inte­rest rate. In both tra­jec­to­ri­es, debt sta­bi­lity is pos­si­ble, mea­ning that the size of the sur­plus and the par­ti­cu­lar arran­ge­ment of inco­me dis­tri­bu­ti­on pro­mo­ted are choi­ces of the govern­ment. A govern­ment pur­suing a redis­tri­bu­ti­ve fis­cal policy to pro­mo­te soci­al chan­ge is not neces­sa­rily incom­pa­ti­ble with long-run debt stability.